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Notes
REINING IN THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL OVERSIGHT AND THE
SUPERSEDER POWER
ABBY L. DENNIS†
ABSTRACT
Virtually immune from judicial sanction, professional discipline,
and civil liability, prosecutors enjoy limitless, unmonitored, and, for
the most part, unreviewable power. This power and insulation from
review invite abuse and public mistrust, shaking confidence in the
criminal justice system. With the system in need of a means of curbing
errant prosecutors and restoring public confidence, this Note explores
a neglected mechanism of prosecutorial oversight—the superseder
power—and argues for increased use of this oversight mechanism,
coupled with explicit guidelines for its use and a public review
process.

INTRODUCTION
In 2006, citizens of Durham, North Carolina, witnessed firsthand
the full breadth of prosecutorial power in the American criminal
justice system and its impact on public trust and community relations.
In March of that year, an African-American exotic dancer accused
three members of the Duke University men’s lacrosse team of rape
and sexual assault.1 The case grabbed headlines, as its elements of
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1. Samiha Khanna & Anne Blythe, DNA Tests Ordered for Duke Athletes, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 24, 2006, at A1.
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2
race, class, and gender captivated the general public. National media
descended on the city. As racial tensions flared within the
community,3 the local district attorney, Michael Nifong, conducted a
barrage of media interviews and continually assured the public that a
4
crime had occurred. The evidence that surfaced over time, however,
failed to conform to his initial statements.5 While the case crumbled,
Nifong’s actions came under scrutiny, and he faced allegations of
prosecutorial improprieties, including failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence,6 inflammatory extrajudicial statements,7 and charges that he
8
pursued the case for political gain. Even so, Nifong remained on the
case. A firestorm of criticism followed, as public confidence in the
handling of the case—and the district attorney’s office—plummeted,9
creating distrust in the North Carolina justice system as a whole.
Lacking a mechanism to remove the district attorney from the case
without his approval, however, state government officials were
powerless to intervene and thwart the misuse of prosecutorial
power.10
The Duke Lacrosse case is just one illustration of a troubling
aspect of the American legal system: the limitless, unmonitored, and,

2.

Erik Brady & Mary Beth Marklein, A Perfect Storm, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2006, at

C1.
3. Benjamin Niolet, Anne Blythe & Jane Stancill, Lacrosse Players’ Lawyers Object,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 2006, at A1.
4. Joseph Neff, Duke Lacrosse Files Show Gap in DA’s Case, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 6, 2006, at A1.
5. Id.
6. Michael Biesecker, Benjamin Niolet & Joseph Neff, DA on Spot for Comments, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 22, 2006, at A1.
7. Matt Dees, Nifong Broke Rules, Bar Alleges, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec.
29, 2006, at A1.
8. Oren Dorell, Duke Case Prosecutor’s Media Whirl Raises Eyebrows, USA TODAY,
May 2, 2006, at A2; Benjamin Niolet, Rape Case Is a Factor, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Apr. 28, 2006, at A1.
9. By the end of 2006, a host of national and regional newspapers had demanded that
Nifong dismiss the charges, recuse himself from the case, or resign from office. E.g., Editorial,
As Duke Rape Case Unravels, Focus Turns to Prosecutor, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 2006, at A12;
Editorial, Disgraceful Nifong Should Depart, WILMINGTON STAR-NEWS, Dec. 27, 2006, at 12A;
Editorial, Investigate the Investigation, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 23, 2006, at A12;
Editorial, The Prosecutor Is Guilty, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 30, 2006, at A22;
Editorial, Prosecutorial Indiscretion, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2006, at B6.
10. Joseph Neff, Benjamin Niolet & Anne Blythe, DA’s Critics Ask Bar, Feds to Intervene,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 3, 2006, at A1.
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11
for the most part, unreviewable power of the local prosecutor. With
the prosecutor, and the prosecutor alone, rests the ultimate decision
to prosecute or not to prosecute12 and the authority to employ “the
13
most terrible instruments of government” against an individual. As
“the most pervasive and dominant force in criminal justice,”14 the
prosecutor wields an immeasurable influence over victims,
15
16
defendants, and the larger community. Indeed, as former United
States Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson once famously remarked, “[t]he prosecutor has more control
17
over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”
Unbounded prosecutorial power is at odds with a government
18
predicated on checks and balances and a legal system based on due
19
process. Not surprisingly, it also invites abuse and public mistrust.
Reports of wrongful convictions and wayward prosecutors who
railroad defendants and bully defense attorneys saturate newspapers
and scholarly commentary,20 shaking public confidence in a system
held up as a model to the world.21 While cynicism about the system
has escalated, however, the crisis has been ignored, as courts and bar
associations have routinely failed to provide adequate oversight of
prosecutorial power and safeguards against misconduct. Indeed, the

11. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY, at xxi
(1980) (“A key characteristic of the American local prosecutor is the independent source of
power he exercises as a result of his locally elected status. He enjoys an unreviewable
discretionary power to prosecute, a power that has been consistently upheld by the courts.”).
12. United States v. Shaw, 226 A.2d 366, 368 (D.C. 1967).
13. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring) (quoting
Felix Frankfurter, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1941, at 20).
14. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 448 (1992).
15. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84–85 (1975).
16. JACOBY, supra note 11, at 195.
17. Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the
Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC.
18, 18 (1940).
18. Hugh L. Carey, N.Y. Governor, The Role of a Prosecutor in a Free Society, Speech
before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 30, 1976), in 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 317, 317–18
(1976); John A. Lundquist, Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion—A Re-Evaluation of the
Prosecutor’s Unbridled Discretion and Its Potential for Abuse, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 485, 485
(1972).
19. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1522 (1981).
20. E.g., Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10,
1999, at A1.
21. Id.
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literature is replete with criticisms of “judicial passivity and bar
22
association hypocrisy.”
This Note adds to the existing commentary by analyzing a
neglected mechanism of prosecutorial oversight: the appointment of
special prosecutors to supersede local prosecuting attorneys in certain
criminal proceedings. Although state officials in some jurisdictions
23
possess this “power of superseder,” they have used it sparingly; in
other jurisdictions, its use by independent officials is altogether
24
unavailable. This Note argues for increased use of the superseder
power, coupled with explicit guidelines for its use and a public review
process that current superseder jurisdictions lack. Part I outlines the
institutional conditions that give rise to prosecutorial power and
misconduct and highlights the failure of traditional remedies to
provide adequate oversight. Part II reviews three approaches to
removing prosecuting attorneys and appointing special prosecutors.
Part III presents a legislative proposal for a powerful form of
executive superseder authority, whereby governors and attorneys
general would be required to intervene when prosecutorial conduct
threatens the public trust, such as in cases involving conflicts of
interest, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, political
controversy, and DNA exonerations.
I. PROSECUTORIAL POWER AND MISCONDUCT
The extent to which prosecutorial abuse of power and discretion
occurs in the criminal justice system remains unknown,25 but studies
of the case law are not encouraging. In a 2003 study, the Center for
Public Integrity found at least 2,012 cases since 1970 in which
“individual judges and appellate court panels cited prosecutorial
misconduct as a factor when dismissing charges at trial, reversing
convictions or reducing sentences.”26 A 1999 study by the Chicago
Tribune yielded sobering results as well, discovering at least 381 cases
22. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, at vi (2d ed. 2005).
23. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 116–34 and accompanying text.
25. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
45, 47 (2005) (noting that “[w]hile many commentators view prosecutorial misconduct as
pervasive, empirical studies have been less conclusive”).
26. Steve Weinberg, Center for Pub. Integrity, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a
Prosecutor Is Cited for Misconduct?, June 26, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/default.
aspx?act=main.
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27
since the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland in
which courts threw out homicide convictions because prosecutors
concealed exculpatory evidence or presented evidence they knew to
28
be false.
Although abuse of prosecutorial power finds its roots in a
number of institutional conditions, three forces particularly
encourage the problem: the lack of transparency that accompanies a
prosecutor’s discretionary authority; the ambiguous ethical
obligations for the prosecution function; and the absence of oversight
29
and accountability for prosecutors. This Part will analyze each of
these contributing factors, focusing in particular on the failure of
traditional remedies to monitor and check the conduct of prosecuting
attorneys.

A. Vast Discretionary Authority with Little or No Transparency
Although the vast prosecutorial power of local district attorneys
is well entrenched in the American legal system, the source of such
power is somewhat of a curiosity. The office of local prosecutor finds
its origin in either explicit constitutional provisions or statutes,
depending on the jurisdiction,30 but the boundless discretionary power
associated with it is more a result of “default rather than a conscious
legislative judgment,”31 finding legitimacy in a combination of
statutory interpretation, the common law, “ambiguous substantive
32
criminal laws,” and “intentional legislative over-generalization.”
Instead of narrowing this power, the judicial branch has contributed
to its development, as the courts have “endowed [the prosecutor]
with great power” over time.33 Moreover, legislatures have declined to

27. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that “the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Id. at 87.
28. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20.
29. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 400.
30. DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 2 (1982).
31. James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 651, 680. But see N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (“The District Attorney shall advise the officers
of justice in his district [and] be responsible for the prosecution on behalf of the State of all
criminal actions in the Superior Courts of his district . . . .”).
32. Lundquist, supra note 18, at 490.
33. JACOBY, supra note 11, at 295.
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34
articulate any limitations on prosecutorial discretion. As a result,
modern prosecutors “wield vastly more power than ever before” and
are increasingly “more insulated” from review.35
This vast discretionary authority is accompanied by little or no
transparency.36 Indeed, prosecutors determine whom to charge, what
charges to file, and how to obtain convictions for those charges in
37
secret. This situation breeds potential for impropriety, as it vests in
one official the power to “invoke society’s harshest sanctions on the
38
basis of ad hoc personal judgments,” which can often be “capricious
or politically induced.”39 Furthermore, because most cases never
reach the trial stage, the motives for these decisions, and any
40
accompanying misconduct, rarely come to light. Even in cases that
do make it to trial, prosecutorial misconduct “can take extraordinary
efforts to uncover.”41 Lack of transparency and “rampant” hidden
42
misconduct in the prosecutorial process provide striking irony in a
system based upon the principles of fairness and due process.43 Thus,
not surprisingly, these institutional ills reach beyond any individual
44
defendant, breeding public distrust in local law enforcement and
45
shaking confidence in our justice system as a whole.

34. JAY DOUGLASS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 2 (1988).
35. Gershman, supra note 14, at 393.
36. Joy, supra note 29, at 400.
37. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 207–08
(1969).
38. Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1555.
39. DAVIS, supra note 37, at 224.
40. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1522 (“The fate of most of those accused of crime is
determined by prosecutors, but typically this determination takes place out of public view—in
the hallways of the courthouse, in the prosecutors’ office, or on the telephone.”).
41. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics
of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 106 (1991)
(“A prosecutor’s ethical breach rarely will appear clearly on the trial record. Often it will be
known only to the prosecutor herself.”).
42. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550,
562 (1987).
43. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1555 (“[P]rosecutors are not held to anything
remotely like what due process would require if they were engaged in an acknowledged rather
than a hidden system of adjudication.”).
44. NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 30, at 2.
45. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20.
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B. Ambiguous Ethical Guidelines
Lack of transparency in the prosecutorial process constitutes just
one of the institutional conditions that have contributed to the
current crisis. Indeed, in theory, a comprehensive set of ethical
guidelines, coupled with effective professional discipline, could
combat the distrust generated by the hidden nature of the
prosecutorial process, providing prosecutors with explicit boundaries
of conduct and reassuring the public that attorneys who crossed these
bounds would be checked. Quite the contrary exists in practice,
though, as vague ethical rules and inadequate remedies for
prosecutorial misconduct actually exacerbate the problem by
“provid[ing] ambiguous guidance to prosecutors” and “creat[ing]
perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain
from, prosecutorial misconduct.”46
The failure of the ethical codes to provide guidance to
prosecutors has been the source of exhaustive commentary.47 The
American Bar Association articulated its first set of ethical guidelines
for prosecutors in 1908 with the adoption of the Canons of
Professional Ethics (Canons),48 which stated that “[t]he primary duty
of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see
49
that justice is done.” Nearly a century later, this ethical guideline has
remained largely unchanged, despite its vague, if not contradictory,
decree. Indeed, although the ABA’s most recent promulgation of
ethical guidelines, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules),
prescribes a handful of special ethical obligations for prosecutors,50

46. Joy, supra note 29, at 400.
47. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 15, 79–98 (describing how the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function fail to establish
rules of ethical conduct); Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving
Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 436–68 (1993) (discussing the
failure of the ethical codes to address prosecutorial conflicts of interest); Bruce A. Green,
Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587–97 (2003) (exploring the
inadequacies of Model Rule 3.8); H. Richard Uviller, Commentary: The Virtuous Prosecutor in
Quest of an Ethical Standard, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145–66 (1973) (discussing a number of
ethical concerns that prosecutors face and arguing that the ABA ethics projects inadequately
deal with these problems); Zacharias, supra note 41, at 53–66 (noting the vagueness of the “do
justice” decree and attempting to provide clarity to the ethical codes).
48. Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 436.
49. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908).
50. Specifically, the Model Rules require that prosecutors 1) refrain from prosecuting
charges that they know are not supported by probable cause; 2) make “reasonable efforts” to
assure the accused has the opportunity to obtain counsel; 3) not seek the waiver of pretrial
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the Rules still rely on the Canons’ basic theme of seeking or doing
51
justice. Yet the “seek justice” decree, practically speaking, is not a
guideline at all,52 and as a result, “the prosecutor is thrown back on his
53
own subjective value and notions about fundamental fairness.”
Not only do the ethical codes fail to provide guidelines for
54
seeking justice, but they also contribute to the “fuzzy” self-image of
prosecutors by conflicting with their institutional responsibility to
seek convictions.55 The political nature of the district attorney’s office
reinforces the prosecutor’s role as zealous advocate. As elected
56
officials, district attorneys use high conviction rates as measures of
57
success, currying public favor for their current political office and, in
some cases, future aspirations, such as advancement to the bench or
58
Congress. Even low-level prosecutors are not immune from the
importance of convictions, as they seek promotion within the legal
59
field. Thus, one part zealous advocate, one part “minister of
justice,”60 prosecutors are cast into “schizophrenic muck”61 and must

rights from the accused without legal representation; 4) make timely disclosure of exculpatory
evidence; 5) not subpoena defense counsel as a witness except in extenuating circumstances; and
6) refrain from making inflammatory extrajudicial statements regarding the accused. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2003).
51. The commentary to the Model Rules states, “A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.” Id. cmt. 1.
52. Gershman, supra note 14, at 445; Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek
Justice?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 622 (1999).
53. Green, supra note 52, at 622.
54. JACOBY, supra note 11, at xv.
55. Joy, supra note 29, at 416; Zacharias, supra note 41, at 106.
56. The chief prosecutor is an elected official in every state except Alaska, Connecticut,
and New Jersey. STEVEN W. PERRY, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ No. 213799, July 2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. In the District of Columbia, the chief prosecutor is also unelected. Id.
57. Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15
AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 205 (1988).
58. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor
Zacharias, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121, 125–26 (2001). As Harvard University Professor Alan
Dershowitz quipped, “Winning has become more important than doing justice. Nobody runs for
the Senate saying I did justice.” Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20.
59. See Dunahoe, supra note 25, at 49 (“[I]ndividual low-level prosecutors are responsible
for a significant percentage of prosecutorial misconduct, and, further . . . these prosecutors seek
primarily to maximize professional gains.”).
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003).
61. Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965,
982 (1985).
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62
bend into “psychological pretzels” to fulfill the duties of their office.
As one commentator notes, “Maintaining the ‘justice’-oriented stance
that the dual role implies is one of the most psychologically difficult
63
tasks that lawyers are asked to perform . . . .” Some commentators
even believe it is impossible to reconcile these competing ethical and
institutional duties.64

C. Lack of Oversight and Accountability
A system with little transparency and ambiguous ethical
guidelines produces opportunities for abuse of power and discretion,
even on the part of well-meaning prosecutors.65 Despite this potential
for abuse, prosecutors face little accountability for their conduct. This
lack of oversight further contributes to the pervasive nature of
prosecutorial misconduct,66 providing the individual who has “more
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in
67
America” with “every incentive, and little disincentive, to engage in
violations that will help . . . produce convictions.”68 But is the existing
framework of prosecutorial oversight truly “meaningless or
69
nonexistent”?
The legal system offers a number of mechanisms that, in theory,
provide oversight of the prosecution function. First, the courts can
directly limit errant prosecutorial conduct within a criminal

62. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2000).
63. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10 (1986).
64. See Uviller, supra note 62, at 1718 (“Passion and dispassion are not cut from the same
mentality.”); Zacharias, supra note 41, at 104 (“[A]sking prosecutors simultaneously to advocate
within a process and assure that the process is fair is inherently contradictory—and perhaps
hopeless.”).
65. See generally Jonakait, supra note 42, at 556 (“These pressures are omnipresent. They
are not aberrations in the system, but part of the system itself. They operate in the routine case
on the well-meaning prosecutor, the prosecutor seeking the correct result. The ethical
prosecutor is told that he must believe in the defendant’s guilt, but the irony is that because he
believes that, he is inevitably pushed toward misconduct. The venal prosecutor seeking the
wrong result may be a danger, but the forces described here are more dangerous, because they
will be strongest on the self-righteous prosecutor, and everything in our criminal justice system
compels the prosecutor to believe the rightness of his cause. In other words, these pressures for
misconduct come when the prosecutor acts like a prosecutor.” (internal citation omitted)).
66. Joy, supra note 29, at 426.
67. Jackson, supra note 17, at 18.
68. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 771
(2001).
69. GERSHMAN, supra note 22, at vi.
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70

proceeding, either remedying the offending action at the trial level
or overturning a conviction on appeal.71 These remedies aim not to
discipline the offending prosecutor, but rather to correct any
72
constitutional wrongs to the individual defendant. Conversely,
professional discipline by bar associations targets prosecutors who
have violated the ethical codes, having little or no impact on wronged
73
defendants. Finally, in addition to judicial remedies and professional
discipline, a wronged defendant may seek damages from a prosecutor
in a civil lawsuit.74 In reality, the effective use of any of these
75
corrective mechanisms is rare. Furthermore, even if employed more
frequently, these remedies possess limitations that make them
inadequate mechanisms for prosecutorial oversight and ineffective
safeguards against misconduct.
1. Judicial Remedies. In theory, trial courts serve an important
prosecutorial oversight function, boasting an arsenal of tools through
which to curb prosecutorial misbehavior, such as the power to
suppress evidence and quash charges.76 In addition, appellate courts
may overturn convictions procured, in part, by prosecutorial
77
misconduct. Yet because the courts employ the exclusionary rule in
suppressing evidence at trial and “harmless error” analysis on appeal,
both of which focus on violations of a defendant’s rights rather than

70. See Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1086 (1994) (noting
suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges as possible remedies).
71. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 77.
72. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“[T]he touchstone of due process
analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the
culpability of the prosecutor.”); Morton, supra note 70, at 1102 (discussing how the exclusionary
rule is “primarily designated for constitutional violations”).
73. See Morton, supra note 70, at 1102 (“Ethical rules . . . were designed to subject
attorneys to discipline, not to supply grounds for remedying breaches of the substantive rights of
the accused.”).
74. JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.02 (3d ed. 2003).
75. See, e.g., GERSHMAN, supra note 22, § 14:9 (discussing the rare use of contempt charges
to sanction errant prosecutors); Gershman, supra note 14, at 454 (rare use of professional
discipline); Green, supra note 47, at 1585 (rare use of civil liability); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time To Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275,
291–92 (2005) (rare appellate reversal).
76. Morton, supra note 70, at 1086.
77. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 77.
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78
the prosecutor’s culpability, judicial remedies do not address the full
scope of prosecutorial misconduct and thus are an inadequate check
on errant prosecutors.79 Indeed, although courts may lament improper
80
actions by prosecutors that fall short of constitutional violations,
their failure to punish prosecutorial misconduct recalls, as one judge
said, “the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters.”81 One
professor amusingly describes the courts’ approach to prosecutorial
misconduct as “[t]he prosecutor screwed up but the defendant is
guilty, so what the hell.”82 The possibility that wronged defendants
can also be guilty, however, reveals a theoretical flaw with judicial
remedies. Specifically, if courts accounted for the full range of
prosecutorial misconduct by suppressing evidence, dismissing charges,
or overturning convictions accordingly, society would suffer the
consequences of a guilty person going free while the prosecutor
effectively would receive no “more than a personal slap on the
wrist.”83 Neither judges nor the public are willing to accept such a high
price to address what both regard as collateral harm at best.
Aside from suppressing evidence or overturning convictions, a
84
court may hold an offending prosecutor in contempt. This remedy,
unlike the ones previously mentioned, goes more to punishing the
prosecutor than relieving the criminal defendant, and thus provides
an avenue for supervising prosecutorial conduct that does not reward
a guilty person with freedom. Its effectiveness, however, is limited to

78. See GERSHMAN, supra note 22, § 14:3 (“Under the harmless error rule, appellate courts
are authorized to ignore trial errors that did not prejudice the defendant’s substantive rights.”);
Morton, supra note 70, at 1100 (“Suppression [under the exclusionary rule] is . . . reserved for
constitutional violations which infringe basic rights of defendants in criminal trials.”).
79. See Zacharias, supra note 41, at 48. (“Constitutional appeals neither guide prosecutors
who overestimate their obligations to defendants nor effectively rein in overaggressive
attorneys.”).
80. Fisher, supra note 57, at 199 (citing United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 44 (1st Cir.
1985)).
81. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
82. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 84.
83. Id. at 77; see also United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[The
prosecutor made] plainly an improper remark, and if a reversal would do no more than show
our disapproval, we might reverse. Unhappily, it would accomplish little towards punishing the
offender, and would upset the conviction of a plainly guilty man.”).
84. Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX.
L. REV. 629, 673 (1972).
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85
cases that reach the trial level. Furthermore, excessive use of the
contempt power may violate the separation of powers doctrine. Not
surprisingly, “trial courts are very reluctant to institute sanctions
against prosecutors, seen as functionaries from another branch of
government with distinct roles of their own to play for the system to
stay in equilibrium.”86 In fact, the separation of powers doctrine
underlines much of the judiciary’s permissive approach to
prosecutorial power and misconduct—in particular, review of the
charging function87—and poses a major obstacle to the judiciary
fulfilling an active role in disciplining prosecutors. Thus, judicial
remedies, whether because of their emphasis on wronged defendants
or because of their inherent constitutional limitations, fail to serve as
proactive checks on prosecutorial power and misconduct.

2. Professional Discipline.
Professional discipline by bar
associations provides another means of checking the power of local
prosecuting attorneys.88 Indeed, some commentators have described
professional sanctions and disbarment as the only effective safeguard
89
against prosecutorial misconduct. In practice, however, this remedy,
like trial sanctions and appellate reversal, is “so infrequent as to
appear non-existent”90 and thus presents only a “slight” threat to a
91
misbehaving prosecutor. Among the 381 homicide conviction
reversals for prosecutorial misconduct discovered in a Chicago
Tribune study, the newspaper reported that none of the offending
prosecutors was subsequently barred from practicing law.92 Sanctions
are even more uncommon in ongoing proceedings.93 “[C]onsequently,

85. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1523 (“But the existence of trials cannot check
prosecutorial powers not dependent on trial.”).
86. Steele, supra note 61, at 981.
87. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
88. WOLFRAM, supra note 63, § 13.10.2.
89. E.g., Green, supra note 47, at 1584–85 (citing NIKI KUCKES, REPORT TO THE ABA
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CONCERNING
RULE 3.8 OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8–11 (1999)).
90. Gershman, supra note 14, at 454.
91. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 77.
92. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20.
93. See Zacharias, supra note 68, at 758 n.130 (surveying the various ways in which state
bar associations respond to complaints filed during ongoing proceedings). Although
unprecedented, state bar disciplinary charges levied during the middle of a criminal case
eventually forced Durham County District Attorney Michael Nifong to ask for a special
prosecutor in the Duke Lacrosse case. Anne Blythe, Joseph Neff & Michael Biesecker, Nifong
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prosecutors may have developed a sense of insulation from the ethical
94
standards of other lawyers.”
Bar associations face two hurdles in employing disciplinary
sanctions as a means of monitoring prosecutorial conduct. For one,
the ethical codes provide little guidance on what constitutes improper
95
conduct on the part of prosecutors; they thus proscribe only a
narrow range of sanctionable actions.96 Not surprisingly, “in the
absence of clearly proscribed conduct,” disciplinary authorities are
not “likely to enter the debate over when lawyers have acted too
aggressively, or not aggressively enough, in prosecuting crimes.”97 In
addition, because they derive their power from the judiciary, bar
disciplinary committees, like the courts, may run afoul of the
separation of powers doctrine when disciplining prosecutors.98 In this
way, disbarment or other sanctions that limit the power of a
prosecutor serve as a “de facto impeachment,” subverting the will of
the public, which voted the prosecutor in office, and the legislature,
which vested expansive powers in the district attorney’s office.99 In
some jurisdictions, prosecutors have used this argument to challenge

Steps Aside, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 13, 2007, at A1; see also infra notes 131–
34 and accompanying text. Nifong’s downfall, however, may have resulted more from the
unique confluence of a number of factors—top-notch defense attorneys, actual innocence, and
the need to rehabilitate the reputation of North Carolina’s criminal justice system—than any
desire of behalf of the state bar to crack down on prosecutorial misconduct. See David Feige,
One-Off Offing: Why You Won’t See a Disbarment Like Mike Nifong’s Again, SLATE, June 18,
2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2168680 (“[I]t took a perfect storm of powerful defendants, a rapt
public, and demonstrable factual innocence to produce the outcome that ended Mr. Nifong’s
career.”); see also Mark Johnson, Disbarment of Nifong Rare Move by Bar: Protection of Peers
or Few Violations the Reason?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 26, 2007, at A1 (noting the
possible influence of two other high profile cases of prosecutorial misconduct on the state bar’s
actions).
94. Steele, supra note 61, at 966.
95. See supra Part I.B.
96. Zacharias, supra note 68, at 738. Professor Zacharias articulates just three areas “in
which disciplinary authorities are likely to have both the wherewithal and inclination to
proceed.” Id. They are: “(1) pretrial and trial conduct that is specifically forbidden in the codes;
(2) engaging in pretrial publicity; and (3) the implementation of prosecutors’ obligations to
report other lawyers.” Id.
97. Id. at 736 n.62.
98. Id. at 761.
99. See Steele, supra note 61, at 968–69 (“Whenever a disciplinary sanction makes it
impossible for a prosecutor to function, that sanction has assumed the role of the impeachment
process in a way that may very well be contrary to the will of both the electorate and the
legislature.”).
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100
Thus, because it does not
disciplinary sanctions—and won.
recognize the scope of prosecutorial misconduct and may violate the
separation of powers doctrine, professional discipline serves as an
inadequate method by which to regulate prosecutorial power, both in
theory and in practice.

3. Civil Liability. The threat of civil liability may also curb
prosecutorial power. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any state official who
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
101
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

In Imbler v. Pachtman,102 however, the Supreme Court significantly
curtailed the use of § 1983 actions as redress for prosecutorial
misconduct, granting prosecutors absolute immunity in initiating a
prosecution and presenting the state’s case.103 Subsequent decisions
have employed Imbler’s functional approach104 to define the scope of
prosecutorial immunity, carving out some instances in which the
prosecutor fulfills an administrative or investigative role and thus
enjoys only qualified immunity.105
The Imbler Court recognized the importance of shielding the
prosecutor from civil liability, noting that “[t]he public trust of the
prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were constrained in making
every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential
liability in a suit for damages.”106 It added, “If the prosecutor could be

100. Id. at 968 (citing Simpson v. Alabama State Bar, 311 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 1975), and
Snyder’s Case, 152 A. 33 (Pa. 1930)).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
102. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
103. Id. at 430–31. Ironically, the Court noted a prosecutor’s “amenability to professional
discipline” as “undermin[ing] the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way
to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.”
Id. at 429. In reality, prosecutors are hardly amenable to professional discipline. See supra notes
88–100 and accompanying text.
104. E.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993).
105. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129–30 (1997) (swearing to the truth of facts in a
certification for determination of probable cause); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275, 278 (manufacturing
false evidence and making statements to the press); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991)
(advising police in the investigative phase of a criminal case).
106. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424–25.
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made to answer in court each time [a defendant] charged him with
wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the
107
pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.” Such considerations
provide a powerful argument against calls to reevaluate absolute
108
immunity for prosecutors and illustrate why civil liability provides
only a limited check on prosecutorial power and misconduct.
*

*

*

Prosecutors enjoy unparalleled discretionary power and
authority within the American legal system. This power often leads to
abuse and misconduct, though, because of the lack of transparency in
the prosecutorial process, the vague ethical duties imposed on
prosecutors, and the failure of existing remedies to provide
accountability and oversight. Given the ineffectiveness of judicial
sanctions, professional discipline, and civil liability, the task becomes
finding a means of oversight that protects defendants’ rights, punishes
errant prosecutors, and restores public confidence in the system. Part
II addresses another potential oversight mechanism—the
appointment of special prosecutors.
II. SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
An additional means of prosecutorial oversight is the use of
special prosecutors to supersede local prosecuting attorneys in
criminal proceedings.109 Such a mechanism presents a proactive
approach to the issue of prosecutorial accountability. “Totally
uninvolved with any social/political complexities attending the
particular case, the special prosecutor [can] concern himself with but
one thing: the efficient and ethical prosecution of the case.”110
Furthermore, because this form of oversight allows an independent
party (i.e., the special prosecutor) to review a local prosecuting
attorney’s files, it provides transparency for the process and deters
errant prosecutorial conduct. Appointments of special prosecutors

107. Id. at 425.
108. For a critique of the absolute immunity that prosecutors enjoy, see generally Douglas J.
McNamara, Buckley, Imbler, and Stare Decisis: The Present Predicament of Prosecutorial
Immunity and an End to its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135 (1996).
109. Lawrence Taylor, A Needed Legal Specialty: The Special Prosecutor, 61 JUDICATURE
220, 221 (1977).
110. Id. at 224.
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111
112
arise in these ways: requests by prosecutors, court order, and
113
executive superseder.
This Part will explore each of these
approaches as a means of curbing prosecutorial power.

A. Appointment by the District Attorney
Special prosecutors may be appointed at the request of the
district attorney. Although the ethical codes have failed to develop
clear guidance on when prosecutors should make such requests,114
mechanisms through which prosecuting attorneys may recuse
themselves from cases and request special prosecutors are not
uncommon.115
In some jurisdictions, though, these mechanisms are the only
means by which a special prosecutor may be appointed to a case.
North Carolina provides one such example. In North Carolina, an
attorney from the state’s Special Prosecution Division “shall be
available to prosecute or assist in the prosecution of criminal cases,”
but only “when requested to do so by a district attorney and the
Attorney General approves.”116 Ironically, North Carolina’s Special
Prosecution Division was formed not to combat prosecutorial
conflicts of interest or misconduct, but rather to “expedite Justice and
provide speedy trials”; to help with the “tremendous caseloads”
encountered in local prosecuting offices; and to provide time and
resources to cases that “involve complex legal questions, extensive
research and expert trial assistance.”117 Over time, however, the office
has evolved as a mechanism by which local prosecutors can decline to
118
participate in controversial matters involving a conflict of interest.

111. See infra Part II.A.
112. See infra Part II.B.
113. See infra Part II.C.
114. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-107 (2006) (stating that district attorneys may be
disqualified upon their own request, at which point “the court having criminal jurisdiction may
appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute or defend the cause”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.733(4) (2006) (“In the event that a prosecuting attorney is disqualified, he shall certify such
fact in writing to the Attorney General who may direct another Commonwealth’s attorney or
county attorney or an assistant attorney general as a special prosecutor to represent the
Commonwealth in that proceeding.”).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-11.6 (2006).
117. H.B. 670, 1973 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1973).
118. Andrea Weigl, State Steps in When Cases Defy the Ordinary, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 14, 2007, at A12.
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The North Carolina attorney general’s office has stated that its
119
Special Prosecution Division handles “dozens of cases a year.” Yet
when used as the sole means through which to appoint special
prosecutors, systems such as the one in North Carolina are
inadequate for a myriad of reasons. First, most recusal statutes
provide little guidance as to when a prosecutor should request a
special prosecutor. North Carolina’s statute, for example, is silent on
the matter.120 Other states’ recusal statutes do somewhat better,
focusing on when prosecutors have a “personal interest in the
121
cause.” Commentators, however, have noted the difficulty in
defining prosecutorial conflicts of interest.122 Such difficulty arises
from the nature of the prosecutorial function itself:123 rather than
advocating for one client, the prosecutor represents a number of
constituencies—including the community, the victim, the defendant,
and the state.124 As such, professional disciplinary boards and courts
have only imposed sanctions for conflicts of interest when the
125
prosecutor has “an axe to grind” or a direct personal interest in the
126
litigation.
Prosecutors, however, may face situations, short of a direct
personal interest in a case, in which their conduct still constitutes a

119. Id.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-11.6.
121. E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 680 (2006).
122. See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 47, at 1160 (“Of the several formulations directly or
indirectly instructing the prosecutor in the ethical imperatives of his calling, none . . . has come
close to dealing clearly or comprehensively with the problem of conflicting interests.”); cf.
Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 436 (arguing that past attempts to codify prosecutorial
ethics have not paid sufficient attention to conflicts of interest).
123. Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 471–72 (“Not having an identifiable client, [the
prosecutor] does not have a readily available benchmark to be used in determining whether he
has a conflict.”).
124. Zacharias, supra note 41, at 57.
125. Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984).
126. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987) (“In a
case where a prosecutor represents an interested party, however, the ethics of the legal
profession require that an interest other than the Government’s be taken into account. Given
this inherent conflict in roles, there is no need to speculate whether the prosecutor will be
subject to extraneous influence.”); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980) (“A
scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may
bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts
raise serious constitutional questions.”); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967)
(affirming the reversal of a domestic dispute conviction when the prosecuting attorney was
retained to represent the wife of the defendant in a divorce proceeding).
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127
conflict of interest: for example, prosecuting a case in which the
prosecutor has previously committed misconduct or undertaking an
explosive case in an election year, among others. The ethical codes
provide no instruction for prosecutors in these situations, and courts
have held that political bias does not constitute an impermissible
conflict of interest.128 These situations, though, are the ones in which
the public trust may be most shattered, and the appointment of a
special prosecutor most needed.
Furthermore, even if states such as North Carolina clearly
articulated the conflicts of interests that would necessitate the
appointment of a special prosecutor, the system would be only as
129
good as the prosecutors it was designed to check. Specifically,
without an independent means by which to appoint special
prosecutors, jurisdictions are at the mercy of local prosecutors, who
may be disinclined to open their case files to an outside party for fear
of disciplinary or political repercussions.130
Indeed, the Duke Lacrosse case illustrated these concerns and
exposed major flaws in North Carolina’s oversight of local
prosecuting attorneys and appointment of special prosecutors.
Despite allegations of prosecutorial improprieties, Durham County
District Attorney Michael Nifong refused to turn the matter over to
131
the state’s Special Prosecution Division. As public distrust and
criticism of the district attorney’s conduct grew, complaints flooded

127. Professors Susan W. Brenner and James Geoffrey Durham differentiate between
“generic conflicts”—that is, those arising from prior representations or personal interests—and
“systemic conflicts.” Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 417. The latter are “inherent in [a
prosecutor’s] distinct responsibilities: the political reality of having to please the electorate; the
necessity of being an advocate; and the ethical requirement of being an ‘administrator of
justice.’” Id.
128. Azzone v. United States, 341 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Terry, 806
F. Supp. 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he undisputed fact that Abrams sought to obtain
political gain from his prosecution of Terry is not enough to disqualify him.”).
129. Commentators have advanced a similar argument regarding the inadequacy of the
existing ethical obligations of prosecutors. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1545 (“[S]uch limits
are likely to be no stronger than the determination of the men and women who abide by them
to limit their own discretion.”). Thus, in effect, states that vest the sole means of appointing a
special prosecutor with the district attorney are preserving the ethical status quo—that is, selfregulation.
130. See Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 444 (“The prosecutor . . . is faced with
making the decision [to withdraw] on his own, followed by the political reality of having to
make his reasons for withdrawal public, thus placing his decision in the political arena.”).
131. John Stevenson & Adam Playford, Nifong: Some Criticism May Be Justified, HERALDSUN (Durham, N.C.), July 29, 2006, at A1.
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132
Under North
the office of Attorney General Roy Cooper.
Carolina’s system for appointing special prosecutors, however, the
attorney general was powerless to act. Ultimately, after the state bar
filed an ethics complaint against Nifong for his conduct in the case,
the beleaguered district attorney acknowledged an unmistakable
conflict of interest and asked Cooper to intervene,133 seven months
134
after legal commentators first suggested that he do so.
Thus, as the Duke Lacrosse case demonstrates, in systems in
which only local prosecuting attorneys may ask for removals, the use
of special prosecutors as a check on prosecutorial power ends up not
being a check at all.

B. Judicial Order
Some jurisdictions vest the judicial branch with the authority to
remove a prosecuting attorney from a case and to appoint a special
135
prosecutor. Theoretically, the courts could invoke this power of
appointment in cases in which the prosecutor has committed
misconduct or failed the public trust. If used in this way, the judicial
appointment of special prosecutors has two existing parallels. First,
viewed broadly, prosecutorial misconduct interferes with the
functioning of the courts,136and thus a court’s removal of an offending
attorney and appointment of a special prosecutor is akin to its
137
exercise of the contempt power. Second, the appointment of special
prosecutors in cases in which prosecuting attorneys have abused their

132. Anne Blythe & Jim Nesbitt, Lacrosse Case in State Hands, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 14, 2007, at A1.
133. Duff Wilson, Attorney General in North Carolina Agrees to Take Duke Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at A20.
134. James E. Coleman, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Special Prosecutor Should Take Over
Duke Case, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 13, 2006, at A10.
135. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 7-7-8 (2006) (“If, in any case, the prosecuting attorney and his
assistants are unable to act, or if in the opinion of the court it would be improper for him or his
assistants to act, the court shall appoint some competent practicing attorney.”).
136. See Paul Lowell Haines, Note, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for
Judicial Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445, 462 (1990) (“Inherent judicial powers are those powers
not expressly granted to the courts by a constitution but recognized to exist merely because they
are necessary for the court’s proper functioning. . . . The court . . . must have the powers
necessary to maintain its integrity as an institution.”).
137. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) (“Courts of justice are
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence,
respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates, and, as a
corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and
insults of pollution.”).
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discretion by committing misconduct or undermining the public trust
is only a natural extension of the various “private challenge
138
statutes” that call for courts to appoint special prosecutors when
prosecuting attorneys have abused their discretion in refusing to
139
prosecute. Thus, just as when a victim alleges prosecutorial abuse of
discretion, a defendant could request a special prosecutor upon a
showing to the court that the prosecuting attorney has committed
misconduct and that the appointment of a special prosecutor is
necessary.140
In practice, however, the judicial power to remove prosecuting
attorneys and to appoint special prosecutors has not been given such
an expansive scope. For instance, in West Virginia, a state in which
the judiciary is vested with such authority,141 if “there is any factual
question as to the propriety of the prosecutor acting in the matter, he
142
must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
Furthermore, the West Virginia Supreme Court has “narrowly
drawn” the authority of the courts to appoint special prosecutors,
limiting its use to “only particular cases in which the prosecutor is
disqualified for any of the standard reasons for disqualifying judicial
or quasi-judicial officers.”143 Those “standard reasons” are
sanctionable conflicts of interest, which only arise in limited situations
in which the prosecutor has a direct personal interest in the
proceeding.144

138. Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory
Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 493 (1988).
139. E.g., TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 5; ALA. CODE § 12-17-186 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5209 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (2006); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 11-16-06 (2006); 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1409 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 968.26 (2006); see also
MINN. STAT. § 388.12 (2006) (allowing a district court judge to appoint an attorney to assist or
serve in place of the county attorney). In State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1977),
the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that, under the relevant statute, “[a]rguably, a private
citizen could petition the district court for action . . . and the court could appoint a special
prosecutor if it decided that this was necessary.” Id. at 365. The court, however, noted the
possible constitutional infirmity of such a use. Id.
140. See Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted
Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 215 (1955) (“Following a showing by a private citizen that the public
prosecutor has abused his discretion through inaction or improper action, the court would have
the power to appoint a privately hired attorney to act as the public prosecutor for a single
action.”).
141. W. VA. CODE § 7-7-8 (2006).
142. State ex rel. Preissler v. Dostert, 260 S.E.2d 279, 287 (W. Va. 1979).
143. State ex rel. Brown v. Merrifield, 389 S.E.2d 484, 487 (W. Va. 1990).
144. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the statutory authority for courts to remove prosecutors
and appoint special prosecutors may need to be “narrowly drawn” to
avoid violating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Specifically, a broad interpretation of these statutes would enable
trial courts to appoint special prosecutors over the objections of
prosecuting attorneys, stripping the executive branch of its power to
145
prosecute and transferring that power to the judiciary. Thus, not
surprisingly, the doctrine of separation of powers has invalidated
private challenge statutes in at least one state146 and formed the basis
of criticisms of the jurisdictions that continue to allow victims to
147
petition trial courts for private prosecutors.
Even if a broad interpretation of the judiciary’s authority to
remove prosecuting attorneys and appoint special prosecutors passed
constitutional muster, the scheme would still fail to check
prosecutorial misconduct because it would vest the power of
prosecutorial regulation in a branch of government that historically
148
has been reluctant to police prosecuting attorneys directly, even for
149
contempt of court. Thus, resting such power on the shoulders of the
judiciary would be an ineffective means of combating prosecutorial
misconduct, both because such authority violates the separation of
powers doctrine and because courts routinely fail to exercise their
existing powers to rein in errant prosecutors.
C. Executive Superseder
Executive superseder power, either by a governor or an attorney
general, provides the third means by which to remove a local
prosecuting attorney from a case and appoint a special prosecutor.
Some jurisdictions vest this power directly with attorneys general as
part of the duties of their office, either because they share concurrent

145. See United States v. Shaw, 226 A.2d 366, 368 (D.C. 1967) (“The trial court should
remember that the District Attorney’s office is not a branch of the court, subject to the court’s
supervision. It is a part of the executive department, separate and apart from the judicial
department.”).
146. In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 873–74 (Wyo. 1984).
147. Green, supra note 138, at 504. In lieu of “[p]rivate challenge statutes that allow courts
to order a prosecutor to proceed or to appoint a special prosecutor to take his place,” which he
rejects as “constitutionally unsound,” id. at 498, Green advocates for the courts to issue
declaratory judgments that a prosecutor has abused his discretion not to prosecute, creating
“public pressure” on the prosecutor and giving the plaintiff “political leverage,” id. at 489.
148. Gershman, supra note 14, at 409; Steele, supra note 61, at 981.
149. GERSHMAN, supra note 22, § 14:9.
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authority to prosecute crimes with district attorneys or because they
possess supervisory powers over local prosecutors.151 For example, in
setting forth the duties of the office of attorney general, section 12550
of California’s Government Code states:
When [the attorney general] deems it advisable or necessary in the
public interest, or when directed to do so by the Governor, he shall
assist any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and may . . .
take full charge of any investigation or prosecution of violations of
law of which the superior court has jurisdiction. In this respect he
152
has all the powers of a district attorney . . . .

This provision has been interpreted as bestowing broad and unilateral
powers of superseder on the attorney general when required by the
153
public interest.
Even in some states in which their duties do not include the
power to intervene in a local matter on their own initiative, attorneys
general still may, on request by the governor, remove a local
prosecutor from a case and appoint a special prosecutor.154 New York
has such a mechanism for appointing special prosecutors; section
63(2) of the state’s Executive Law grants the governor sweeping
authority to direct the attorney general to “attend in person, or by
one of his deputies, any term of the supreme court or appear before
the grand jury thereof for the purpose of managing and conducting in
such court or before such jury criminal actions or proceedings as shall
be specified in such requirement.”155
New York’s system for appointing special prosecutors
occasionally has led to litigation, with most challenges dealing with
notice and reasonableness of superseder orders.156 Relying on the
state’s constitutional mandate that the governor “shall take care that

150. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550 (2006).
151. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.090 (2006).
152. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550.
153. Attorney General May Supersede District Attorneys in Justices’ Courts Prosecutions
as Well as Those in Superior Courts, 46 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 385 (1947).
154. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (2006); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney
2006).
155. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(2).
156. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1997) (supersession in a
potential death penalty case); Mulroy v. Carey, 396 N.Y.S.2d 929, 929–30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977),
aff’d, 373 N.E.2d 369, 369 (N.Y. 1977) (supersession in an investigation involving allegations of
corruption among public officials).
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157
the laws are faithfully executed,” the New York courts, however,
have repeatedly upheld the validity of the governor’s power of
superseder under Executive Law section 63(2).158 Indeed, the courts
have found that this provision, together with article IV, section 3 of
the New York Constitution, provides the governor with unlimited
authority to supersede a local prosecuting attorney in any matter.159
Even with this broad grant of power, New York governors have
historically been reluctant to exercise the power of superseder, stating
that the office should only supersede the local prosecuting attorney in
“extraordinary emergencies” and “unusual circumstances or
conditions.”160 Professor Robert Pitler notes, “The power of
superseder has been used rarely, and such is its design.”161
Despite their reluctance to exercise the power of superseder and
its correspondingly rare use, governors have not entirely disregarded
and neglected the mechanism. Between 1907 and 1973, New York
governors employed the power of superseder in at least seventy-nine
cases.162 Governor Hugh Carey ordered the supersession of a district
163
attorney on five occasions during his two terms as governor, and
Governor Mario Cuomo exercised the power of superseder sixteen
times between 1983 and 1994.164 Governor George Pataki used the
power sparingly, ordering the attorney general to supersede a local
prosecuting attorney just four times during his tenure as governor
from 1995 to 2006 and exercising the power last in 1996.165
When they have exercised the power of superseder, New York
governors have not limited its use to traditional cases of
disqualification, such as when the local prosecuting attorney possesses

157. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
158. Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1005.
159. Id. at 1006. The Johnson court noted, “No such limitation appears in the Constitution
or statutes, and none has been found in prior case dealing with these very issues.” Id.
160. See, e.g., 1894 PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR FLOWER 66–67.
161. Robert M. Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City—The
Constitutionality and Legality of Executive Order No. 55, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 517, 522 (1973).
162. Lawrence T. Kurlander & Valerie Friedlander, Perilous Executive Power—Perspective
on Special Prosecutors in New York, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 49 n.103 (1987).
163. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, §§ 3.14, 3.31, 3.42, 3.50, 3.78 (2006).
164. Id. §§ 4.83, 4.89, 4.106, 4.110, 4.115, 4.122, 4.124, 4.128, 4.138, 4.144, 4.165, 4.174, 4.175,
4.180, 4.183, 4.184. Neither Governor Carey nor Governor Cuomo’s tallies include any
appointments made pursuant to §§ 1.55–.59, in which Governor Rockefeller ordered the
Attorney General to investigate and prosecute public corruption in New York City beginning in
1972. After eighteen years, Governor Cuomo terminated those orders in 1990. Id. § 4.139.
165. Id. §§ 5.6, 5.9, 5.27, 5.42.
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a direct personal interest. Rather, they have employed the power in a
variety of situations that threatened the public trust, including cases
166
racial tension,167 and the death
involving police corruption,
168
penalty. Because of their unlimited authority to supersede, New
York governors also have the power to remove a local prosecuting
attorney and appoint a special prosecutor upon allegations of
169
prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, believing that the boundless
power and discretion afforded to prosecuting attorneys was at odds
with American ideals of officials with limited powers,170 Governor
Hugh Carey viewed the power of superseder as a means of checking
171
errant prosecutors. In a speech to the New York Bar Association,
Governor Carey remarked, “A Chief Executive is inevitably tempted
to abdicate any responsibility for law enforcement and to leave to the
people, the prosecutors, and the courts the thankless chore. I will not
do so. A constitutional form of government is at stake.”172
Because the district attorney “is a state executive officer
performing a state function and is therefore subject to the exercise of
the governor’s executive power,”173 New York’s method of removing
prosecuting attorneys and appointing special prosecutors does not
possess the same constitutional infirmities as a model that affords the
judicial branch the same power.174 Likewise, it vests an independent
party (i.e., the governor and/or attorney general) with an oversight
function, thus avoiding the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise
when local prosecuting attorneys have the sole authority to remove
themselves and ask for special prosecutors in certain cases.175 The
executive power of superseder, however, is not without its share of

166. Id. §§ 1.55–.59.
167. Id. § 4.89. For a detailed summary of the “Howard Beach incident,” in which surviving
victims of a racial attack refused to cooperate in an investigation due to mistrust of the police
and local district attorney, a stalemate that eventually required the governor to appoint a special
prosecutor to handle the investigation, see Kurlander & Friedlander, supra note 162, at 56–58.
168. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, § 5.27.
169. See Maurice H. Nadjari, New York State’s Office of the Special Prosecutor: A Creation
Born of Necessity, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 116 (1974) (“The Attorney General could also
undertake investigation and prosecution of misconduct by a district attorney, if the Governor
issues an Executive Order superseding the district attorney’s local prosecutorial power.”).
170. Carey, supra note 18, at 317–18.
171. Id. at 323.
172. Id. at 318.
173. Pitler, supra note 161, at 545.
174. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
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concerns. Part III will address those concerns as part of a
comprehensive legislative proposal that calls for states to adopt an
executive power of superseder.
III. A PROPOSED METHOD OF
APPOINTING SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
The unlimited power of local prosecutors and the lack of
effective and timely remedies for prosecutorial misconduct demand a
means of oversight through which independent executive officers may
employ a power of superseder in certain criminal proceedings to
remove a local prosecutor and appoint a special prosecutor. Yet
officials with this power rarely have exercised it, even in states in
which the power enjoys expansive scope and potential application.176
Furthermore, some jurisdictions have tied the hands of state officials
177
so they cannot employ the superseder power at all. The infrequent
use of this form of prosecutorial oversight is unfortunate, and
legislatures and executive officers should reconsider this policy of
deference to local prosecuting attorneys. This Part argues that state
legislatures should establish an executive superseder power and
provides a framework through which this mechanism can serve an
important prosecutorial oversight function while also minimizing the
problems that arise when “unfettered discretion”178 shifts from one
public official to another.
Legislatures should implement an executive power of superseder
because such power directly targets the institutional conditions that
contribute to prosecutorial abuse of power and misconduct. First, it
provides a form of prosecutorial oversight that, unlike appellate
reversals or professional discipline,179 addresses both the wronged
defendant and the errant prosecutor. By placing a case in the hands of
a special prosecutor, the mechanism provides the defendant a fair
process, affording the defendant an impartial prosecutor who is
180
unassociated with any of the events surrounding the case. At the
same time, removal from a case also may serve as a public reprimand
of the offending prosecutor: in contrast to appellate reversals that

176. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 116–34 and accompanying text.
178. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1016 (N.Y. 1997) (Smith, J., dissenting).
179. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
180. Taylor, supra note 109, at 224.

03__DENNIS.DOC

156

11/1/2007 3:18:11 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:131

often shield prosecutors from shame by omitting their names from
181
the names of prosecutors removed from cases by
opinions,
independent parties are public knowledge. Moreover, the
appointment of special prosecutors also introduces transparency in
the prosecutorial process. Specifically, special prosecutors who have
access to the files of the original prosecuting attorneys may unearth
prior misconduct or improper actions that would have remained
hidden without review by an independent party.
The scope of the executive power of superseder must be broad
and extend beyond cases in which the prosecutor has a direct
182
personal interest in the litigation. Supersession statutes should
provide that the governor or attorney general’s office must employ
the superseder power to remove a local prosecutor when the
prosecutor faces “a difficult case beyond his investigative and legal
183
abilities.” Additionally, such statutes should grant the executive
branch the power to appoint special prosecutors in cases involving
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct184 or police abuse.185 The
statutory authority of the governor or attorney general’s office to
appoint a special prosecutor also should extend to second trials of
cases in which misconduct by the prosecuting attorney resulted in a
186
and situations involving DNA
mistrial of the first trial
exoneration.187

181. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20 (“In their written opinions, appeals courts
rarely name prosecutors, even those found to have acted abominably.”).
182. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
183. Taylor, supra note 109, at 221.
184. Carey, supra note 18, at 323.
185. FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at 93.
186. In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that the bar of
double jeopardy under the United States Constitution only attached in situations in which a
prosecutor’s misconduct was intended to “goad” the defendant into moving for a mistrial in the
first trial. Id. at 676. Thus, Professor Gershman notes:
[A] prosecutor with a weak or damaged case is encouraged to commit prejudicial
conduct. If he gets away with it, he has a better chance of winning. If the defendant
objects, and succeeds in obtaining a mistrial, the prosecutor will be able to retry the
defendant with a better-prepared case . . . .
Gershman, supra note 14, at 440. The appointment of a special prosecutor in these cases could
limit this abuse.
187. Alan Hirsch, The Tragedy of False Confessions (And a Common Sense Proposal), 81
N.D. L. REV. 343, 348–50 (2005) (reviewing MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE
NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. (2003)). Specifically, “[w]hen a credible case of
DNA exoneration is made, responsibility for the defendant should automatically be transferred
to a different office from that which prosecuted him.” Id. at 349.
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An oversight mechanism, however, that transfers the boundless
power of one public official to another raises its own set of
concerns—specifically, the potential for abuse, especially in politically
controversial situations. New York Governor George Pataki’s
removal of Bronx County District Attorney Robert Johnson from a
potential death penalty case involving a slain police officer in 1996
188
provides one such example. Almost exactly one year after he
succeeded in reinstating New York’s death penalty after eighteen
years,189 Governor Pataki unilaterally decided to remove Johnson
from the case, stating:
The murder of a police officer is a stain on society. The individual
who commits such a crime, and who was proven in a court of law
beyond a reasonable doubt to have perpetrated this crime, should
face a jury of twelve men and women to determine whether the
death penalty is appropriate. A prosecutor who refuses to consider
190
that course must be superseded.

Although the New York Court of Appeals validated Governor
Pataki’s actions under Executive Law section 63(2) in Johnson v.
191
Pataki, Judge Smith’s dissent voiced concern over the power of
superseder in death penalty cases, noting that “[w]hatever evils may
flow from the exercise of unfettered discretion in the decision-making
process, they are not addressed or remedied by the self-appointed
192
transfer of discretion from one individual to another.” In addition,
governors may improperly use the power “to immunize political
friends and even to prevent scrutiny of corruption in a governor’s
own administration.”193 Political pressures may also lead governors

188. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, § 5.27 (2006) (executive order requiring
Attorney General Dennis Vacco to supersede District Attorney Robert Johnson).
189. James Dao, Death Penalty in New York Reinstated After 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice
Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A1.
190. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Pataki Signs Executive Order to
Supersede Bronx District Attorney Johnson (Mar. 21, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). Ironically, Governor Pataki noted Johnson’s political philosophy against the death
penalty improperly influenced Johnson’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and thus was a
reason for supersession. Id. (“The law states that we have a death penalty. District Attorney
Johnson refuses to enforce this law. I have no choice but to replace District Attorney Johnson
with someone . . . who will not allow political philosophy to control his professional
responsibility and judgment . . . .”).
191. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1997).
192. Id. at 1016 (Smith, J., dissenting).
193. Pitler, supra note 161, at 547.
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not to use the power of superseder, such as when its use may offend
influential constituencies or threaten political allies.
Because of the potential for such abuse, a system that enables a
governor or attorney general to supersede a local prosecuting
attorney must include guidelines articulating when such power may
194
195
be exercised, as well as a means of reviewing its use. Specifically,
the governor or attorney general’s office must implement a means by
which defendants, local public officials, and even members of the
general public may make requests for special prosecutors as well as a
framework to review these requests in a uniform manner. New York
Governor Mario Cuomo initiated such a process, creating a
committee that, when called upon by the governor, was to “consider
and evaluate individual requests for the appointment of a special
prosecutor”; “obtain the response of the local district attorney”;
“report to the Governor the nature of the request and the response of
the local district attorney”; and “recommend to the Governor
whether additional action pursuant to section 63 of the Executive
Law should be taken.”196
The governor or attorney general’s office should also create a
separate grievance committee to examine cases of alleged
197
This committee would make
prosecutorial misconduct.
recommendations to the governor or attorney general for the
appointment of special prosecutors upon a finding of prosecutorial
impropriety. It would also require that the governor or attorney
general report any violation of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct to the state bar grievance board, thus serving as a powerful
deterrent for errant prosecutorial conduct. To provide transparency
for the superseder process, the recommendations of both committees

194. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 224 (discussing “the need to formulate procedures to deal
with the substitution of prosecutors in a more uniform and effective way”).
195. See Kurlander & Friedlander, supra note 162, at 62 (“[A] regular procedure and
consistent standard for review of special prosecutor requests will serve to highlight the
extraordinary nature of the power and to add a level of review assistance to the Governor’s
exercise of the appointment power.”).
196. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, § 4.109 (1995).
197. Such a committee could be modeled loosely after Texas’ short-lived Prosecutor
Council. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 332d (Vernon 1977) (repealed 1985); see also Steele,
supra note 61, at 982–88 (proposing an independent commission to handle allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct); Yaroshefsky, supra note 75, at 297–98 (same). Unlike the Prosecutor
Council of Texas or other proposed independent prosecutorial commissions, however, the
committee’s mission would be limited to advising the executive in the appointment of special
prosecutors, not disciplining errant prosecutors.
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should be made available to the public in an annual report issued by
the governor or attorney general’s office.
In addition to the executive branch’s internal safeguards, the
judiciary must take an active role in reviewing the executive’s use of
the superseder power. Review by the courts would enable prosecutors
to challenge removal from a case. It also would protect communities
from unwarranted usurpation of the duties of locally elected public
officials by governors or attorneys general. In his analysis of New
York’s power of superseder, Professor Pitler argues for such a review,
noting that “some narrow standard of review would not interfere too
greatly with the executive power, and yet could protect the public
198
from arbitrary and capricious executive action.” Indeed, although
they have bestowed seemingly limitless superseder power on the
governor, the New York courts have “reserved the possibility that in
some undefined circumstance, the courts could invalidate this
executive action.”199 With its broad superseder mandate, New York
Executive Law section 63(2) does not define the circumstances in
which a governor may act beyond the scope of the superseder
authority. As such, to assist judicial review of the process, state
legislatures must clearly delineate the scope of the power of
superseder and the instances in which governors or attorneys general
may use such power in the supersession statutes.
An additional safeguard against potential abuse by the executive
branch may be to vest the power of executive superseder with
200
attorneys general instead of governors. Although popularly elected

198. Pitler, supra note 161, at 547.
199. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (N.Y. 1997) (citing Mulroy v. Carey, 373
N.E.2d 369, 369 (N.Y. 1977)). The court in Johnson v. Pataki declined to define the standard by
which to review the executive superseder power, questioning whether “one [was] applicable at
all.” Id. at 1007. In his dissent, Judge Smith argued for a “rational basis” standard of review. Id.
at 1014 (Smith, J., dissenting).
200. Vesting the power of superseder with attorneys general raises constitutional concerns
in some jurisdictions. Specifically, a number of state constitutions expressly grant district
attorneys the exclusive authority to prosecute crimes in their districts. E.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV,
§ 18. In these jurisdictions, a statute that grants the power of superseder to the governor would
not be unconstitutional because of the governor’s constitutional duty to “take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.” Id. art. III, § 5, cl. 1. A jurisdiction that vested such superseder power
with the attorney general, absent an amendment to the state constitution, might be, however.
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201
202
to office and driven by their own political aspirations, attorneys
general still enjoy a lower public profile than their gubernatorial
counterparts. Furthermore, as lawyers, they may possess greater
knowledge of the legal system and thus may take a more informed
approach in exercising the power of superseder.
Even with established standards and procedures for appointing
special prosecutors and judicial review of such appointments, the
executive superseder power may still possess some limitations. For
one, a mechanism that allows for the removal of prosecuting
attorneys and the appointment of special prosecutors may invite
abuse by defense attorneys eager to undermine the authority of the
203
local prosecutor. Such abuse, if rampant, could potentially cripple
the power of local prosecuting attorneys: preoccupied with fear of
offending influential defense attorneys, prosecutors might temper
their duty to prosecute in certain situations.204 It also could drain the
resources of the state’s highest executive offices by overwhelming the
system with frivolous requests for special prosecutors. Given the
natural reluctance of governors and attorneys general to remove
prosecutors from cases,205 however, this concern is likely insignificant
and almost certainly outweighed by the benefits of an independent
oversight mechanism. Furthermore, any potential misuse of the
system by parties with improper motives may be deterred by assessing
costs for reviewing such complaints or even levying fines against
aggressive defense attorneys.206

201. Attorneys general are popularly elected in all but seven states. Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys
Gen., How Does One Become an Attorney General?, http://www.naag.org/how_does_one_
become_an_attorney_general.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
202. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2246, 2253 (2006) (noting “the political
reality that the Office of the Attorney General has long been seen by many of its occupants as a
stepping stone to the Governor’s office”).
203. See WOLFRAM, supra note 63, § 13.10.2 (discussing how complaints to disciplinary
agencies “may be motivated by a desire to compromise the political power of the prosecutor’s
office”); Zacharias, supra note 68, at 758 (noting the potential for defense attorneys to make
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct to “manipulate bar proceedings for tactical purposes”).
204. The Supreme Court expressed the same fears with respect to civil liability in Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), noting that exposing prosecutors to civil liability “would prevent
the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system.” Id. at 427–28.
205. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
206. Private challenge statutes, such as those discussed in Part II.B, face similar abuse. To
thwart unfounded actions by individuals eager to reap financial rewards in subsequent civil
actions, one recommended victims’ private challenge proposal has advocated assessment of such
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Finally, the appointment of special prosecutors as a means of
checking prosecutorial power and combating misconduct may prove
only to be a Band-Aid remedy for a broken institution that, as some
207
commentators have noted, begs for a drastic overhaul. Indeed,
limited resources on the part of the governors and attorneys general208
as well as public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys
may restrict the use of superseder to only the most egregious
instances of prosecutorial misconduct and community distrust. These
cases, however, are the ones most likely to grace front pages of
newspapers and taint the general public’s perception of the
prosecutorial process. As such, an independent check on local
prosecutors in these cases will help repair public confidence in the
legal system. Moreover, the specter of superseder may force
prosecutors to account for their conduct in all cases—including the
less visible ones—lest a special prosecutor ever review a case file and,
upon discovering misconduct, report such improprieties to the
appropriate officials.209
CONCLUSION
On April 11, 2007, nearly three months after his office received
Michael Nifong’s request and assumed control of the case, North
Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper dismissed all charges in the
Duke Lacrosse case, declared the three indicted players innocent, and
called the incident “the tragic result of a rush to accuse.”210 Two
months later, the North Carolina State Bar disbarred Nifong, finding
that his conduct during the case constituted prosecutorial dishonesty

costs to the victim’s private prosecutor to discourage malicious prosecutions. Comment, Private
Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, supra note 140, at 233.
207. See Jonakait, supra note 42, at 565 (advocating “systemic reform”).
208. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 224 (discussing the costs of both retaining private
attorneys to serve as special prosecutors and increasing the size of the attorney general’s office
to accommodate a larger special prosecutions division).
209. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that attorneys report misconduct on
the part of their peers: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional
authority.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2003).
210. Attorney Gen. Roy Cooper, Comments by Attorney General Roy Cooper: State v.
Finnerty, Evans, Seligmann 1 (Apr. 11, 2007), http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentStreamer
Client?directory=PressReleases/&file=Dismissal%20Statement%20Press.pdf.
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211
and misconduct. In the aftermath of the tumultuous affair, Durham
governmental leaders created a committee to review the handling of
the case,212 and the North Carolina General Assembly considered a
213
number of bills addressing criminal justice reform. The tragedy of
the case, though, is that an earlier intervention by the North Carolina
Attorney General could have avoided the toll it took on the
defendants’ lives and the public’s confidence in the criminal justice
system. Indeed, Attorney General Cooper recognized the need for
prosecutorial oversight in North Carolina when he dismissed charges
in the Duke Lacrosse case, noting “the enormous consequences of
overreaching by a prosecutor” and calling for a form of judicial
superseder to remove errant prosecutors from cases.214
As this Note has argued, however, that power should rest with
the executive office, rather than with the judiciary. Prosecutors bear
the burden of maintaining order and confidence in the criminal justice
system, working to punish the guilty but also striving to protect the
innocent. Many perform their duties with the utmost integrity. But
the public, as well as prosecutors themselves, demand more of the
system than internal controls and an individual’s “own attitudes and
beliefs on inner morality.”215 Enhanced use of special prosecutors,
appointed by independent executive officials, provides a means of
curbing errant prosecutors and restoring public confidence in the
criminal justice system. This mechanism has largely been ignored by
members of the state executive and legislative branches. State
officials, however, should reconsider this option in limiting the power
of local prosecutors. The integrity of the American legal system
demands it.

211. Joseph Neff, Anne Blythe & Mandy Locke, Nifong Stripped of Law License for
Lacrosse Case Misconduct, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 17, 2007, at A1.
212. Joseph Neff, Lacrosse Probe Has Much Fodder, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
July 1, 2007, at B1.
213. Anne Blythe, Bills Would Let DAs Sit on Some Records, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), May 4, 2007, at A1.
214. Attorney Gen. Roy Cooper, supra note 210, at 2.
215. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20 (quoting Bennett Gershman, Professor of Law,
Pace Univ.).

